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Abstract—Wireless sensor networks are vulnerable to several 
attacks, one of them being the black hole attack. A black hole is a 
malicious node that attracts all the traffic in the network by 
advertising that it has the shortest path in the network. Once it 
receives the packet from other nodes, it drops all the packets 
causing loss of critical information. In this paper we propose a 
reliability analysis mechanism. The proposed reliability analysis 
scheme overcomes the shortcomings of existing cooperative black 
hole attack using AODV routing protocol. As soon as there is a 
path available for routing, its reliability is checked using the 
proposed scheme. The proposed reliability analysis scheme helps 
in achieving maximum reliability by minimizing the complexity of 
the system. The final path available after the reliability analysis 
using the proposed scheme will make the path secure enough to 
minimize the packet loss, end-to-end delay and the energy 
utilization of the network as well as maximize the network lifetime 
in return. 
Keywords: Blackhole attack, AODV Protocol, Malicious Node, 
Reliability, WSN 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A wireless sensor network consists of a large number of 
wireless sensor nodes which are randomly deployed in the 
network [1] and have the ability to communicate with other 
sensor nodes. The sensor nodes are mobile in nature and have 
self-organizing capability that makes them flexible for 
communication in areas that have geographical and terrestrial 
constraints such as disaster areas and battle fields [2, 3]. Sensor 
nodes arrange themselves dynamically to create route among 
them to form a wireless network on the fly [3]. Recent research 
on wireless sensor network shows that they are more vulnerable 
to attacks than static networks. Therefore, any security 
solutions that are applicable for static routing network don’t 
work well for wireless sensor network.   
Wireless sensor network requires much stronger and 
effective security methods to confront the attacks caused by the 
malicious nodes in the network. Some of the attacks caused by 
the malicious nodes are Black hole attack, worm hole attack, 
hello flood attack, gray hole attack, denial of service[4,5] etc.  
In this paper, we focus on the cooperative black hole attack. 
A black hole attack is an active attack in which a compromised 
node consumes all the data of the network. A black hole node 
falsely replies to all the route request packets during the route 
setup to the destination[6]. Once it receives the packets, it drops 
all of them leading to loss of information. A cooperative black 
hole attack consists of many such compromised nodes that 
work together and cause serious damage to the whole network. 
 In this paper, we try to overcome the limitations of an 
existing algorithm that works against the cooperative black hole 
attack [3].  We propose an algorithm that measures the 
reliability of every path that is established between the source 
and the destination. By analysing the reliability of every route 
or path, we make the network more secure and reliable for 
communication. We show, via simulations that our proposed 
algorithm works better in comparison to the existing algorithm. 
We also evaluate, via simulations, our proposed algorithm and 
compare it with the existing solution in terms of reliability, 
packet loss and end-to-end delay. The analysis shows that our 
proposed algorithm is much more effective than the existing 
solutions in terms of reliability and thus, it makes the network 
security stronger and immune to attacks. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives 
the related works that have been carried out in the area of black 
hole attack. Section 3 explains about the proposed algorithm in 
detail. Section 4 provides the simulation results. Section 5 
concludes the paper with a brief overview of the future work. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Many researchers have proposed different mechanisms to 
prevent black hole attack. Some of the works existing works are 
as follows. 
In [2], Virmani et al proposed an algorithm to detect 
malicious nodes in the network using Selective Repeat ARQ in 
watchdog. In this mechanism, a node X monitors the 
transmission that occurs between the source and the destination. 
If any node misbehaves, it is detected by this monitoring node 
X and report about the maliciousness of a node is given to the 
source.  
Seong et al [7] proposed two solutions to prevent black hole 
attack. In the first solution, the source node finds more than one 
path to the destination i.e. redundant routes and then identifies 
which is a safe route and which is unsafe and contains malicious 
nodes. In the second solution, each node maintains two extra 
tables:  one for last-packet-sequence-numbers for the last 
packet sent to every node and the other for last packets during 
setting up the network. During the RREP phase, the destination 
node must include the sequence number of the last packet 
received from the source. When the source receives the RREP, 
it compares the last sequence number with the value saved in 
its table. If the two values match, the transmission will take 
place. Otherwise the node that replies is a malicious node.   
Sun et al [8] proposed a neighbourhood based methodology 
to detect the black hole attack. It determines the neighbour set 
for each node and compares them to determine whether a black 
hole attack occurs in the network. It establishes a path to the 
true destination in order to minimize the impact of the black 
hole attack. 
Medadian et al [9] proposed an algorithm to combat black 
hole attack in AODV routing protocol. In this algorithm, a 
number of rules are established to check the honesty of a node. 
The activity of a node is judged by its neighbour. Every 
neighbour sends its opinion about a particular node to the 
source. Based on these opinions, the source decides if the 
replier is a malicious node.   
In [3], Hesiri et al proposed an algorithm to detect 
cooperative black hole attack in AODV routing protocol 
(Figure 1). It consists of a DRI table with from and through 
entries. This table keeps track of whether or not the node did 
data transfers with its neighbours. To check the reliability of a 
node, the source asks the NHN (next hop neighbour) for the 
DRI entry of the node. Based on this information, source 
determines the reliability of a node.  But this algorithm suffers 
from several limitations. 
1) Large overhead: A lot of computation is required in this 
algorithm because for checking the reliability of the 
network 3 piece information is being brought from the 
NHN. 
2) Collusion: Two nodes in the path (intermediate and next 
hop neighbour) can easily deceive the source node by 
sending the false information. 
3) Endangered Information: When information is brought 
from the NHN then the information passes through the 
intermediate node only. If it is malicious it can easily 
tamper the information. 
4) Go NO-GO Signal: Another problem is in the DRI Table. 
The flags stored are not enough to judge that the path is 
reliable or not. 
5) Memory wastage: Each node stores the information about 
all the nodes which falls in its transmitting path. 
III. PROPOSED MODEL 
In our proposed model, we conglomerate AODV protocol 
with reliability analysis to detect malicious nodes. The 
limitations mentioned above are overcome by reliability 
analysis scheme.  We discuss various aspects of the model in 
the sub-sections below. 
A. Data Routing Information (DRI) Table 
Similar to the [3] we use a DRI table in our proposed scheme. 
But we maintain the number of packets sent and received in our 
table instead of maintaining flags. A DRI table determines 
whether a node has forwarded data through its neighbours and 
whether it has received data from its neighbours. Each 
neighbour has a DRI entry which consists of the number of 
packets sent to a node and the number of packets received from 
that particular node. The DRI table is updated when a 
neighbour sends data packet to a node or receives data packets 
from the node.  
Based on the entries (No. of Packets Sent, No. of Packets 
Received) in the table, we calculate the reliability ratio of the 
route consisting of the neighbours of the node. 
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DRI Table is shown in Table 1. The table includes three 
columns; Packet ID, Number of Packets Sent, and Number of 
Packets Received. 
Table 1: DRI Table 
Packet ID No. of Packets 
Sent  
No. of Packets 
Received 
   
   
 
B. REL Packet 
This is a special packet which is sent after the route has been 
discovered. REL packet keeps track of the reliability of each 
node. 
           𝑅𝐸𝐿 = 𝑅𝐸𝐿 + 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜  
              
When the DRI entry for a node is requested from the NHN 
and a reply is received, it is checked if this reply packet contains 
the same information that the source node has for this NHN. If 
the two entries match, the REL (reliability) is updated by 
adding the reliability ratio of the NHN to the existing REL. This 
process continues for each NHN of the source. The REL for 
every NHN is returned to the source node on the basis of which, 
the source node selects the path with maximum reliability. 
Given below is the format of the REL Packet (Figure 2). 
 
Source Destination 
Next Hop 
neighbour 
REL 
C. Routing Table 
In our proposed scheme, we introduce two new columns in 
the Routing table -Reliability Count and Hop Count. Reliability 
Count consists of submission of reliability of all the nodes. 
With the help of reliability column we are able to compare the 
reliability of different paths. Hop count determines the no. of 
hops between the source and the destination (See Table 2). 
Figure 1: AODV Flooding 
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Table 2: Routing Table 
Source Destination Next Hop 
neighbour 
Reliability 
Count 
Hop 
Count 
     
     
 
D. Scheme 
The first step consists of route discovery using AODV 
Protocol.  When a node has to send packets to another node, it 
checks in its routing table whether a route to that destination 
exists. If the destination exists, then the source will ping the 
destination. After the source pings the destination, if a reply 
packet comes from the destination then the path to the 
destination is already established and so, a list of Intermediate 
Nodes (IN) is generated for the source. In case the reply doesn’t 
come back from the destination within a specified time or the 
route to the destination doesn’t exist, then RREQ (Route 
Request) packets are broadcast by the source to discover a route 
to the destination. Nodes that receive this RREQ packet either 
reply with a RREP packet or broadcast the RREQ packet 
further in the network. A list of IN is generated after receiving 
all the RREP packets. 
Now let us consider a path from the source node S to the 
destination node D where A, B, C are the intermediate nodes 
(See Figure 3).  As mentioned before, a black hole node is the 
one that consumes all the packets and transmits none. So, it’s 
guaranteed that the Source node S that is transmitting packets 
to other node, cannot be a black hole node and that is why we 
consider S a reliable node. 
 S requests for its DRI entry from its NHN i.e. node A. At 
the same time, the feedback timer (tF ) is initialized to some 
real-time delay. If the NHN replies within the specified time, 
then the reply is accepted. If the feedback timer expires and no 
reply has been received, then another request will be sent to the 
NHN. This process repeats till the counter for reply (CR) 
reaches its threshold value before the reply is received. Once 
the CR reaches its threshold value, source node is notified and 
the counter for malicious node (CM) is incremented by one. 
When S receives the DRI entry from node A, it cross checks 
the entry to the one maintained in its buffer for the NHN’s. If 
the two entries do not match, then REL is set to ZERO and CM 
is incremented. If CM exceeds the threshold value, the path is 
declared ass UNTRUSTED.  
But if the two entries match, then Reliability Ratio is 
calculated and added to the existing REL. Then S checks 
whether its NHN is the destination or not. If it is then no need 
to send the REL packet further but if it is not REL is forwarded 
to the NHN and the whole process is repeated. In this way if the 
entry keeps on matching REL will keep on summing up in the 
REL packet. After the packet reaches its destination then it is 
returned back to the source node where the entry for reliability 
is made. Finally the average is taken up for all paths by applying 
the mean route reliability (MRR) and the path will highest 
reliability is chosen. 
A B C S D 
1. Start 
2. Cm =0, CR =0 and tF =T1 
3. IF Destination in Routing table THEN 
3.1. Ping Destination 
3.2. IF Reply Received THEN 
3.2.1. Go to 6 
ELSE 
3.2.2.  Go to 4 
ELSE 
4. RREQ 
5. RREP 
6. List of IN is generated 
7. IF NHN is Destination THEN 
7.1. Go to 8 
ELSE 
7.2. Request DRI Entry from NHN for current 
Node 
7.3. IF tF==0 THEN  
7.3.1. CR = CR + 1 
7.3.2. IF CR > k THEN 
7.3.2.1. CR =0 
7.3.2.2. Go to 7.2  
ELSE 
7.3.2.3. Go to 7.2 
ELSE 
7.3.3. IF Reply Received THEN 
7.3.3.1. IF the entry is Matched THEN 
7.3.3.2. REL = REL + Reliability Ratio 
7.3.3.3. REL packet is forwarded to 
NHN 
7.3.3.4. Go to 7 
ELSE 
7.3.3.5. Cm =Cm+1 
7.3.3.6. REL=0 
7.3.3.7. IF Cm>k THEN 
7.3.3.7.1. Path is untrusted 
7.3.3.7.2. Go to 11 
ELSE 
7.3.3.7.3. Go to 8 
8. REL packet sent back to Source 
9. MRR is calculated 
10. Path with maximum reliability is selected 
11. END 
Figure 3: Path Established 
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Figure 4: Proposed Flowchart 
E. Algorithm 
The flow chart for the proposed algorithm is shown in Figure  
4. There are two counters maintained in the proposed model: 
1)  tF :  It is a timer for feedback which ensures that the 
entries are received within given time frame.  
2)  Cm:  It is counter for detecting malicious node. When it 
hits it threshold then we assume that the node is malicious. 
3)  CR:  This is a counter which is incremented every time 
when the tF is incremented. When this counter hits it threshold 
then Cm is incremented by one. 
IV. RESULTS 
In this paper, we consider four performance metrics to 
evaluate our proposed solution and to compare it against other 
existing solutions to prevent black hole attack. Since a black 
hole node drops the packets, there is a considerable loss of 
packets in the network. So packet loss is a performance metric 
in our analysis. Packet loss affects the throughput ratio of the 
network and so, we consider this metric as one of the 
performance metrics. We also take into account the end-to-end 
delay as another performance metric. Mean Route Reliability is 
one of the most important performance metric that we have 
considered in this paper and we show that the route selected by 
our proposed scheme is the most reliable of all. 
The formulae for the four metrics is given as follows:  
1) Throughput Ratio  
 The throughput is the number of bytes transmitted or 
received per second. The throughput ratio, denoted by 
η, is calculated as follows: 
  Where ηir is the average receiving throughput for 
the ith application, ηi s is the average sending 
throughput for the ith application, and k is the 
number of applications[3]. 
 
2)  Packet Loss Percentage 
Data packet loss rate, L is calculated as follows: 
 
Where Pis and Pir are the number of data packets sent 
by the sender and the number of data packets received 
by the receiver, respectively for the ith application, 
and k is the number of applications[3]. 
3)  End-to-End Delay 
Average end-to-end delay of the data packets, denoted 
by E, is calculated as 
follows:  
where ei is the average end-to-end delay of data 
packets of ith application and k is the number of 
applications[3]. 
4) Mean Route Reliability  
 
𝑀𝑅𝑅 =
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜
𝐻𝑜𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡
 
 
Where Reliability Ratio and Hop count have already been 
discussed above. 
 
For evaluation of our proposed scheme and comparison of 
our proposed scheme with the existing solution proposed by 
Hesiri in [3], we implement both the solutions and show 
simulation results using MATLAB.  We carry out 100 
simulation runs to get the appropriate results. We measure 
throughput, packet loss, end-to-end delay against the number of 
black hole nodes in the network and also measure reliability as 
a period of time. 
 Figure 5 shows throughput with respect to the number of 
black hole nodes. We consider 10 black hole nodes in our 
network. The simulation results show that the Hesiri [3] 
protocol has 65% throughput. But our proposed scheme 
provides a throughput of 76%. This depicts an increase of 16.92% 
throughput with our proposed scheme which shows that our 
proposed reliability scheme is better in terms of throughput 
than the existing solution proposed by Hesiri [3]. 
 
           Figure 5: Throughput vs. No of Blackhole Nodes 
Figure 6 shows the packet loss percentage with respect to the 
number of black hole nodes. The simulation results show that 
the existing protocol by Hesiri depicts a packet loss percentage 
of 50% whereas our proposed scheme shows a packet loss 
(3) 
(4) 
 
 
 (5) 
(6) 
percentage of 20% only. Thus, the packet loss percentage 
shows a decrease of 60%  in our proposed scheme. 
 
Figure 6: Packet Loss vs No of Blackhole Nodes 
Figure 7 shows the end-to-end delay with respect to the 
number of black hole nodes. The simulation results show that 
our proposed scheme shows an end-to-end delay of 0.065 
whereas the existing solution shows an end-to-end delay of 
0.092. Thus, the decrease of end-to-end delay in our proposed 
scheme is 29.34%. 
 
Figure 7: End to End Delay vs No. of Blackhole nodes 
Figure 8 shows the reliability as a period of time. The 
simulation results show that our proposed algorithm has a 
reliability of 99% whereas the existing solution has a reliability 
of 60%. The increase in reliability is 66% for our proposed 
scheme.  
All the above simulation results illustrates that our proposed 
algorithm works better than the existing solutions for the 
removal of black hole attack in the network. scheme.  
 
 
  
Figure 8: Reliability vs Time  
V. CONCLUSION 
Wireless sensor network are susceptible to black hole attack 
that severely affects the whole network. To counter black hole 
attack, we proposed an algorithm that prevents this attack by 
detecting the black hole nodes.  Our simulation results show 
that our proposed scheme improves the network security by 
establishing a secure route which has maximum reliability. We 
also show, via simulation results, that our proposed scheme is 
better than existing schemes for preventing black hole attack in 
terms of reliability, throughput, end-to-end delay and packet 
loss. Thus, our proposed scheme works successfully to counter 
black hole attack. In future, we aim to focus on other type of 
attacks that affect the network and try to develop methods to 
eliminate them from the network. 
REFERENCES 
[1] I.F. Akyildiz, W. Su, Y. Sankarasubramaniam, and E. Cayirci, “Wireless 
sensor networks: A survey, Computer Networks”, pp. 393–422, 2002. 
[2] D. Virmani, N. Batra and A. Soni,  “Detection of Malicious nodes using 
Selective Repeat Automatic Repeat Request protocol for Wireless Sensor 
Networks”, Proceedings of the Third International Conference on 
Computational Intelligence and Information Technology, Elsevier ,pp. 62-
67, October 2013. 
[3] H. Weerasinghe and H. Fu, “Preventing Cooperative Black Hole Attacks in 
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks: Simulation Implementation and Evaluation”, 
International Journal of Software Engineering and Its Applications, Vol. 2, 
No. 3, July 2008. 
[4] G. Padmavathi, D. Shanmugapriya,“A Survey of Attacks, Security 
Mechanisms and Challenges in Wireless Sensor Networks”, International 
Journal of Computer Science and Information Security, vol.4, 2009. 
[5] A.S.K. Pathan, H.W. Lee, C.S. Hong, “Security in Wireless Sensor 
Networks: Issues and Challenges”,  Communications, IEEE Transaction,  
Feb 2006. 
[6] S. Dokurer, “Simulation Of Black Hole Attack In Wireless Ad-Hoc  
Networks”, A Thesis Submitted To The Graduate School Of Natural And 
Applied Sciences Of Atilim University; Sept 2006. 
[7] M. Al-Shurman, S.M. Yoo and Seungjin Park, “Black Hole Attack in 
Mobile Ad Hoc Networks”, Proc. ACMSE’04, April 2004.  
[8] B. Sun, Y. Guan, J. Chen and U. W.  Pooch, “Detecting Black-hole Attack 
in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks”, EPMCC 2003. 
[9] M. Medadian, A. Mebadi and K. Fardad, “Detection and Removal of 
Cooperative and Multiple Black Hole Attack in Mobile ADHOC 
Networks”, International Conference on Computer and Software 
Modeling, vol.14, 2011. 
